Maggie House – Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16: Supreme Court of Canada recognized a new Tort of Intimate Partner Violence. What it is, how we got here, and what this means for survivors of family violence. Published June 18, 2026.
A big change in family law in Canada recently: the Supreme Court of Canada – the country’s highest court – has created a new way to hold abusers accountable to their victims. The “Tort of Intimate Partner Violence” allows survivors of abuse to sue their ex-partners for monetary damages. A successful claim will require the survivor to prove three elements:
- the abusive conduct arose during the relationship or in its aftermath;
- the abuser intended to engage in the abusive conduct; and
- that the abusive conduct constitutes “coercive control” – that the abuser’s conduct had the effect of depriving the survivor of their dignity, autonomy, and equality in the relationship.
A recap how we ended up here: Ms. Amrit Ahluwalia was self-representing in the Ontario Superior Court in divorce proceedings against her husband Kuldeep Ahluwalia. Ms. Ahluwalia inadvertently set in motion the course we are now on by adding a curious, and yet unseen claim in her court pleadings: she asked for damages to be paid to her by her husband for the significant abuse she suffered at his hands during their marriage. This included severe physical violence, as well as psychological, financial, and emotional abuse.
At trial, the judge found that it was appropriate to award Ms. Ahluwalia damages for her suffering, created a new tort of family violence and awarded Ms. Ahluwalia $150,000 in damages.
The appeal court rejected the recognition of a new tort. They decided that the existing torts were sufficient and awarded her $100,000.
The Supreme Court Decision
6 of the 9 SCC judges found that it was appropriate to recognize of a new tort of intimate partner violence (“IPV”), while 3 judges dissented.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kasirer, analyzed the appropriateness of the existing torts in law in addressing intimate partner violence and found them lacking. They recognized the new tort to address this gap in justice and provide recourse to survivors.
The court explains that this new tort is not confined to physical injury but rather is broad and encompassing to include many types of conduct that has the effect of depriving survivors of autonomy. For example, this includes acts of physical, and psychological abuse, but also isolation, manipulation, surveillance, financial abuse, sexual coercion, and intimidation.
The types of abuse intended to be captured by the IPV tort are distinguishable from “mere grievances”, and from hurtful or vengeful behaviour often present in the dissolution of high-conflict relationships. The presence of honesty, infidelity, emotional neglect and disagreements may contribute to the end of a relationship but does not necessarily mean that a party’s conduct was coercively controlling.
The court also recognized the highly gendered nature of IPV. Anyone can experience IPV, but the reality is that it is mostly women who are victimized and mostly men who are perpetrating it.
The torts of battery and assault are largely concerned with episodic violence between strangers. The nature of IPV is, well, intimate. There is deeper and more complex harm that flows from being abused by someone you love or loved, and the effects are often long-lasting. IPV is also not a one-off punch to the head on the street. IPV is often many different types of abuse – sexual, physical, financial, psychological and more – and often repeated over time.
In a similar vein. The tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) is also inadequate. IIED is limited to emotional harm and does not adequately capture the matrix of harms caused by IPV.
IPV is, at its core, about coercive control. These are abusive actions that result in the deprivation of autonomy, dignity and equality within an intimate partnership. Whether the abuse is discrete or part of a pattern, the new tort fixes on conduct that is intentioned to overpower the will of the subject of the abuse. It is precisely the nature of an intimate partnership that creates this unique opportunity for the abuse to occur.
The court explained the three elements of the new tort that the survivor must prove:
First, the conduct must arise in the context of an intimate partnership or its aftermath, with the court noting that “the mere fact that the parties have formally separated does not necessarily put a end to the intimate partner violence” (para 185).
Second, the abuser must have intentionally engaged in abusive conduct. The conduct cannot have been an accident to qualify as a tortious IPV. This doesn’t mean that the plaintiff has to prove that their abuser subjectively intended for their conduct to coercively control them or to cause a specific type harm. Rather, it means that the defendant engage in the conduct willfully (para 186).
The court dispels the myth that intimate partner violence must be punctuated by egregious incidents of physical or psychological abuse (referencing the evidence of Ms. Ahluwalia that her husband para 187):
I recall that, in Ms. Ahluwalia’s marriage, she endured “silent treatment” and denigration that undermined her autonomy in the relationship. Intimate partner violence can comprise psychological interference or harassment that would not rise to the threshold of “flagrant or outrageous” required by IIED but, because it can be understood as part of a low-grade pressure that objectively brings about domination in the relationship, stands as wrongful under the new tort. What matters is not the number or frequency of incidents, but the effect on the protected interests of the victim.
Third, the abuse must constitute coercive control – a burden that is “readily met” when the abuse arises in an intimate partnership. This is because whether a single act, or many, a reasonable person would likely regard abusive conduct as incompatible with the dignity, autonomy and equality within a relationship, unlike with misconduct between strangers.
How much money?
The court speaks to Ms. Ahluwalia’s submissions denouncing what she called the “family discount” in assessing damages for awards of family violence. This comment was a criticism of the tendency for courts to award far less to survivors of family violence for the similar conduct when perpetrated by a stranger. The reason, they say, is tied to the myths and stereotypes about IPV – that IPV is less serious, that survivors are less credible, or less worthy of compensation than those whose perpetrators were strangers. The court described the well documented phenomenon as one that requires correction and denunciation. By example, the court provides the comparison of damage awards of $100,000 to almost $300,000 for sexual violence perpetrated by someone at arms length (e.g not in a relationship), versus just $10,000 when the sexual assault occurred in the context of an intimate partnership. To the contrary, the court affirms that IPV, a “social ill”, is worthy of monetary awards which fully compensate survivors without discount or exceptionalism” (para 227).
Ultimately, the SCC left the award amount undisturbed as the parties had made an out of court settlement for $100,000. The court did comment on the trial and appellate courts’ reasoning, however.
What this means for survivors of intimate partner violence
An old colleague of mine would often say “the justice system is a terrible place to seek
justice”. This is especially true for family violence survivors. There is a chasm between
what the law says about family violence, and what judges do in the courtroom and it is
not an easy task to obtain a protection order.
We do not wear rose-coloured glasses. The Ahluwalia decision is not going to fix this
issue in one fell swoop. Tort or no tort, the myths and stereotypes about women fleeing
abuse (women exaggerate, women lie to gain an advantage in court, etc. – see the
case of KMN v SZM, 2024 BCCA 70) have poisoned the proverbial well.
As lawyers who work with clients fleeing intimate partner abuse, we know that survivors
will continue to face these challenges, continue to beg for protection orders and not get
them, continue to be disappointed and let down by the system, and be left vulnerable to
continuing violence. Check out Stats Canada on the gendered nature of domestic
homicide.
But at the end of it all, we have this additional tool in my toolbox that we can pull out and
say: “If the judge doesn’t grant you this protection order, at least that punch in the nose
will be worth a paycheque”.
In order to give you the best opportunity to obtain a protection order or damages under
the new tort, our team of lawyers have the experience to help guide you through this
challenging time, and will give you the best opportunity to ensure that you are protected.
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